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Online Appendix to:  
Economic Crisis and the Breakdown of Democracy  
in the Interwar Years: A Reassessment 
Jørgen Møller, Alexander Schmotz & Svend-Erik Skaaning ∗ 
Abstract: »Online-Appendix zu: Wirtschaftskrise und demokratischer Zusammen-
bruch in der Zwischenkriegszeit: Eine Neubewertung«. In this online appendix we 
investigate if the results presented in the main paper, Economic Crisis and the 
Breakdown of Democracy in the Interwar Years: A Reassessment, are robust to 
alternative modeling strategies, alternative configuration of control variables, 
alternative follow-up time, reduced (European) sample, alternative measure of 
the outcome variable, and the use of logistic regression instead of survival 
analysis. The robustness checks generally lend further support to our general 
conclusions. 
Keywords: Democratic breakdowns, economic crisis, interwar, survival analysis. 
1.  Robustness: Alternative Modeling Strategies 
To test the robustness of our findings, we replicate the results reported in Table 
2 in the article using various alternative model specifications. In particular, we 
present a set of models with alternative configuration of control variables (see 
1.1); estimate Cox models using a country’s continuous years of democracy as 
follow-up time (rather than the time-on-study approach applied in the article, 
where democratic years in the interwar period constituted follow-up time; see 
1.2); and restrict the analysis to a European sub-sample (1.3). For all Cox mod-
els, we test for non-proportional hazards using the established Grambsch and 
Therneau (1994) numerical proportionality test. Where necessary, we adjust for 
non-proportional hazards by including interaction terms of the problematic 
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covariates with a function of survival time (see Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 
2001; Golub 2007, 2008). We test all combinations of linear, logarithmic, and 
squared functions of time of the violating variables, and present the model with 
the best fit according to Akaike’s Information Criterion. As a last robustness 
check, we rerun the analysis applying logistic regression models with random 
and fixed effects (1.4). The results in these robustness tests strongly support the 
findings of the article. Finally, we report a set of models excluding GDP per 
capita as an explanatory variable to show that the lack of significance of the 
years of democratic experience is due to collinearity with this covariate (2).  
1.1  Alternative Configuration of Control Variables 
Table OA1 below provides variations of the models presented in Table 2 in the 
article featuring a slightly different set of control variables. Table OA2 pro-
vides the proportional hazards tests. The first three models employ a variable 
capturing the presence of strong agrarian elites with a slightly different coding; 
the fourth to sixth model include an additional control variable, namely a 
dummy variable denoting whether a country is a newly established one.  As 
implied by the proportional hazards tests in Table OA 1, models one and five 
show some evidence of time-dependence regarding the effect of the crisis indi-
cators (lagged growth and two-year average, respectively). Other than that, and 
apart from some minor changes to the effects of control variables, the findings 
confirm to the ones presented in the article. 
Table OA1: Cox Regression Models of Interwar Democratic Breakdown,  
    Alternative Control Variables 
 Democratic Breakdown 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth t-1 
0.029   -0.001   
(0.068)   (0.019)   
Average Growth (Two Years 
Preceding) 
 -0.055*   0.032  
 (0.031)   (0.031)  
Average Growth (Three Years 
Preceding) 
  -0.098***   -0.098** 
  (0.035)   (0.039) 
Growth t-1 * ln(T) 
-0.016      
(0.039)      
Average Growth (Two Years 
Preceding) * T2 
    -0.001***  
    (0.0003)  
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 
-3.566 -3.164 -3.548 -1.540** -1.668*** -1.419** 
(3.096) (2.832) (2.919) (0.624) (0.640) (0.606) 
Continuous Years  
Democratic + 1 (ln) 
-1.730 -1.550 -1.549 -2.204 -1.833 -1.955 
(1.525) (1.392) (1.339) (1.908) (1.562) (1.680) 
Presidential System -0.232 -0.199 -0.147 -0.907 -0.839 -0.740 (0.534) (0.532) (0.517) (0.724) (0.736) (0.639) 
Proportional System -0.640 -0.387 -0.185 -0.560 -0.353 -0.266 (0.740) (0.703) (0.662) (0.614) (0.710) (0.553) 
Agrarian Elite    0.742 0.613 0.603    (0.493) (0.525) (0.495) 
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Table OA1 continued... 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.584 -0.396 -0.299 0.181 0.303 0.350 (0.519) (0.548) (0.539) (0.502) (0.503) (0.506) 
World War I Loser 1.990 1.803 1.491 0.736 0.545 0.585 (1.531) (1.533) (1.383) (0.473) (0.448) (0.412) 
Agrarian Elite (Alternative 
Coding) 
0.279 0.012 -0.165    
(0.616) (0.539) (0.514)    
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 * ln(T) 0.907 0.831 1.015    (1.399) (1.302) (1.348)    
World War I Loser * ln(T) -0.896 -0.852 -0.753    (0.758) (0.771) (0.696)    
Agrarian Elite (Alternative 
Coding) * T2 
0.010* 0.011** 0.012**    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
New Country    1.183 1.207* 0.980    (0.735) (0.730) (0.753) 
Events 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Spells 37 37 37 37 37 37 
Observations 502 494 486 502 494 486 
Log Likelihood -43.235 -42.268 -41.170 -43.481 -40.762 -41.981 
LR Test 30.701*** (df = 12) 
32.119*** 
(df = 11) 
33.638*** 
(df = 11) 
30.210*** 
(df = 9) 
35.130*** 
(df = 10) 
32.016*** 
(df = 9) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on countries) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * < .1, ** < .05, ***< .01. 
Table OA2: Proportional Hazards Test of the Cox Models with Alternative  
  Control Variables 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Growth t-1 -0.255*   -0.256   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.211   -0.293*  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.026   -0.123 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1   0.215*   0.241*   0.256*   0.096   0.169   0.132 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) -0.054 -0.072 -0.056 -0.075 -0.068 -0.072 
Presidential System   0.103   0.092   0.143 -0.03 -0.022 -0.025 
Proportional System   0.009   0.02 -0.017 -0.093 -0.037 -0.063 
Agrarian Elite      0.176   0.155   0.162 
Agrarian Elite (Alternative Coding)  0.204**  0.195*   0.214*    
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.302 -0.239 -0.258  0.026   0.033   0.021 
World War I Loser -0.26*** -0.302*** -0.33** -0.117 -0.202 -0.229 
New Country    -0.054 -0.065 -0.045 
Global Test 10.914 10.692 9.893 5.965   6.806   4.918 
1.2  Alternative Follow-Up Time: Continuous Years Democratic 
The choice of appropriate follow-up time is crucial and non-trivial in event histo-
ry analysis. In the article, we follow the so called ‘time-on-study’ approach. Here, 
the time a subject is on study serves as follow-up time, and the real ‘age’ of sub-
jects are included into models as a control variable. In our analysis, time on study 
is given by the years a country had been democratic during the interwar period; 
the ‘age’ of a democratic regime is the time it had continuously been democratic 
up until that point. While the time-on-study approach is the most frequently ap-
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plied, an obvious alternative is to use age as a time scale rather than a control. We 
rerun our models using this alternative time scale. 
Table OA3 shows the results of proportional hazards test following Gramb-
sch and Therneau (1994) on the naïve version of these models. We find evi-
dence of non-proportionality associated with the variables marking presidential 
systems and World War I losers. We adjust the models for non-proportional 
hazards on these variables in table OA4. 
Table OA3: Proportional Hazards Test of the Cox Models with Duration of  
   Democracy as Follow-up Time 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Growth t-1 -0.142   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.035  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.144 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 0.092 0.052 0.2 
Presidential System  0.335 0.368* 0.415** 
Proportional System  0.166 0.185 0.245 
Agrarian Elite  0.187 0.224 0.304* 
Ethnic Fractionalization  0.002 0.067 0.117 
World War I Loser -0.262 -0.32*     -0.447*** 
Global Test 5.787 7.42 11.911 
 
Table OA4 shows the Cox regression results with non-proportionality adjust-
ments suggested by Table OA3. Crucially, the results regarding the crisis indica-
tors are substantively very similar to the ones in the time-on-study models in the 
article. Note, that the continuous democratic years are not included anymore as an 
explanatory variable, because this count variable now is used as dependent varia-
ble and would thus be cancelled out as a perfect predictor.  
Table OA4: Cox Regression Models of Interwar Democratic Breakdown,  
   Duration of Democracy as Follow-Up Time, Model 2 Adjusted for  
   Non-Proportional Hazards 
 Democratic Breakdown 
(1) (2) (3) 
Growth t-1 
-0.023 
  (0.023)   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)    -0.135*** (0.041)  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)     -0.211*** (0.071) 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 
 -1.495** 
(0.684) 
-0.880 
  (0.697) 
-0.667 
 (0.606) 
Presidential System -0.275   (0.474) 
-4.157* 
(2.131) 
-3.064 
  (2.109) 
Proportional System 0.237 (0.901) 
-0.35 
   (0.851) 
0.139 
(0.877) 
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Table OA4 continued... 
Agrarian Elite 0.985 (0.703) 
0.769 
(0.625) 
-2.139* 
(1.300) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.118 (0.567) 
0.451 
(0.428) 
0.686 
(0.528) 
World War I Loser 0.582 (0.550) 
0.923 
(1.425) 
0.632 
(1.083) 
Presidential System * ln(T)     1.803** (0.815) 
 1.355* 
(0.820) 
Agrarian Elite * ln(T)      1.370** (0.676) 
World War I Loser * ln(T)  -0.272  (0.706) 
-0.251 
  (0.536) 
Events 18 18 18 
Spells 55 55 55 
Observations 680 668 656 
Log Lokelihood -41.567 -37.008 -34.384 
LR Test 7.728 (df=7) 
16.212* 
(df=9) 
20.057** 
(df=10) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on countries) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *< .1, **< .05, ***< .01. 
1.3  European Sample 
We run our models on a sample restricted to European countries only. Table 
OA5 provides the results of the proportional hazards tests. No violations of the 
proportional hazards assumption are detected. Consequently, Table OA6 pre-
sent the unaltered proportional hazards models. The findings from the article 
regarding effects and significance levels of crisis indicators are corroborated: 
While the one-year lag of growth and the two-year average are not significant, 
the three-year average is significant at the one percent level. 
Table OA5: Proportional Hazards Test of the Cox Models Based on European  
   Countries 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Growth t-1   0.175   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)    0.136  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)    -0.166 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1  0.027 0.14    0.237 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) -0.404 -0.425   -0.676 
Presidential System -0.054 -0.133   -0.109 
Proportional System -0.153 -0.123 -0.32 
Agrarian Elite   0.161   0.124     0.203 
Ethnic Fractionalization   0.129   0.108   0.28 
World War I Loser   0.154   0.128     0.253 
Global Test   2.694   3.263     3.037 
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Table OA6: Cox Regression Models of Interwar Democratic Breakdown,  
   European Countries 
 Democratic Breakdown 
(1) (2) (3) 
Growth t-1 
0.025 
  (0.59)   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.078 (0.107)  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.338*** (0.121) 
GDP/cap. (ln) t-1 
-4.403*** 
(0.910) 
-4.530*** 
(0.956) 
-5.584*** 
(1.207) 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) -19.520 (20.512) 
-19.569 
(23.304) 
-18.068 
(25.867) 
Presidential System 0.839 (0.526) 
0.968* 
(0.521) 
1.916** 
(0.767) 
Proportional System -4.926** (2.413) 
-4.534** 
(2.185) 
-3.759** 
(1.590) 
Agrarian Elite 3.582*** (0.989) 
3.379*** 
(1.025) 
3.036*** 
(0.761) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 3.792** (1.924) 
3.633** 
(1.808) 
3.342** 
(1.472) 
World War I Loser 2.161* (1.270) 
1.787 
(1.326) 
0.772 
(0.918) 
Events 10 10 10 
Spells 21 21 21 
Observations 298 291 284 
Log Lokelihood -10.372 -10.077 -8.235 
LR Test (df= 8) 34.150*** 34.275*** 37.198*** 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on countries) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *< .1, **< .05, ***< .01. 
1.4  Logistic Regression Models 
Also the use of alternative statistical methods in the form of random and fixed 
effects logistic regression lead to results that are in line with the findings based on 
survival analysis as the relationship between economic growth and democratic 
breakdown is stronger for two-year and three-year moving averages than the one 
year lagged growth variable, which does not achieve statistical significance. 
Table OA7: Logistic Regression Analysis of Interwar Democratic Breakdown  
  (Skaaning et al.), Random and Fixed Effects 
 Random Effects Fixed Effects 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Growth t-1 
-0.10 -1.326 
(3.406) (2.993) 
Average Growth (Two 
Years Preceding) 
-0.90** -8.355**
(4.263) (4.466) 
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Table OA7 continued... 
Average Growth (Three 
Years Preceding) 
-0.113** -9.874 
(5.213) (5.475) 
GDP/cap. (ln)t-1 
-3.381** -2.471*** -2514***
(1.863) (0.780) (0.772) 
Continuous Years 
Democratic + 1 (ln) 
0.523 0.127 0.105 
(0.740) (0.300) (0.300) 
Presidential System -0.239 -0.332 -0.365 (0.727) (0.591) (0.592) 
Proportional System 0.724 0.506 0.529 (0.905) (0.647) (0.643) 
Agrarian Elite 1.669* 1.117** 1.113**(1.158) (0.622) (0.624) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.322 -0.192 -0.179 (0.760) (0.619) (0.612) 
World War I Loser 0.975 0.881 0.771 (0.892) (0.706) (0.716) 
Constant 20.444** 14.939*** 15.420***(11.960) (5.724) (5.677) 
Log-Likelihood -64.573 -62.140 -61.408 -37.604 -35.131 -34.261 
Spells 33 33 33 16 16 15
Observations 502 494 486 157 153 148
Entries are logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Significance 
levels: *< 0.1, **< 0.05, ***< 0.1 (one-sided). 
2.  Models Excluding GDP Per Capita 
In the article, we included GDP per capita and the continuous years a country 
has been democratic as control variables, among others. The democratic years 
variable remained insignificant, although we would expect it to reduce the risk of 
democratic breakdown. This non-finding is arguably due to collinearity between 
the variables of democratic years and GDP: Older democracies tend also to be the 
richer countries. In order to show that democratic years do exert an effect in their 
own right, we exclude GDP per capita in the following set of models. Table OA8 
gives the proportionality test, Table OA9 the Cox results. We see that democratic 
years exert a time dependent effect: In the early years of the interwar period, 
being an old democracy does not necessarily reduce the risk of breakdown, but in 
the later years it does. We can see this from a joint interpretation of the interac-
tion term of democratic years and survival time and the component of the inter-
action, the coefficient of democratic years. The component is not significant, 
implying that democratic experience does not have an effect initially.  
The interaction effect, however, is consistently significant and negative at 
the five percent levels throughout all models, indicating that democratic expe-
rience reduces the risk of democratic breakdown later in the interwar period. 
The pattern of this interesting finding should be investigated in more detail, but 
this online appendix is not the time and place for that. At this point, we are 
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content with having shown that the lack of significant of democratic years in 
the models in the article are due to effects of multicollinearity.  
Table OA8: Proportional Hazards Test of Cox Regression Models of Interwar  
   Democratic Breakdown, Excluding GDP Per Capita 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Growth t-1 -0.305   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.201  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.17 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln)    -0.194**  -0.18*      0.0174* 
Presidential System -0.085  -0.056   0.018 
Proportional System -0.164  -0.054   0.004 
Agrarian Elite      0.444***       0.461***       0.489*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.289* -0.228 -0.282 
World War I Loser   -0.415***    -0.471***    -0.501*** 
Global Test 15.188** 15.017** 17.822** 
Table OA9: Cox Regression Models of Interwar Democratic Breakdown,  
    Excluding GDP Per Capita 
 Democratic Breakdown 
(1) (2) (3) 
Growth t-1 
0.003 
(0.017)   
Average Growth (Two Years Preceding)  -0.057** (0.027)  
Average Growth (Three Years Preceding)   -0.132*** (0.039) 
Continuous Years Democratic + 1 (ln) -0.912 (0.610) 
-0.826 
(0.530) 
-0.890 
(0.567) 
Presidential System -0.903 (0.847) 
-0.758 
(0.805) 
-0.615 
(0.786) 
Proportional System -1.605 (1.011) 
-1.276 
(0.946) 
-1.027 
(0.860) 
Agrarian Elite -3.931* (2.085) 
-4116** 
(2.039) 
-4.480** 
(2.123) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.746 (0.629) 
0.697 
(0.472) 
0.827* 
(0.493) 
World War I Loser 1.895 (1.354) 
1.869 
(1.321) 
1.688 
(1.268) 
Years Democratic * T2 -0.038** (0.018) 
-0.037** 
(0.017) 
-0.036** 
(0.017) 
Agrarian Elite * ln(T) 2.588** (1.087) 
2.628** 
(1.072) 
2.759** 
(1.095) 
Ethnic Fractionalization * T2 -0.002 (0.005) 
2.808 
(1.986) 
2.521 
(1.622) 
World War Loser * ln(T) -1.109* (0.589) 
-1.097* 
(0.588) 
-1.052** 
(0.536) 
Events 18 18 18 
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Table OA9 continued... 
Spells 37 37 37 
Observations 502 494 486 
Log Lokelihood -39.508 -38.491 -37.261 
LR Test 38.156*** (df=11) 
39.671*** 
(df=10) 
41.456*** 
(df=10) 
Entries are Cox regression coefficients with robust standard errors (clustered on countries) in 
parentheses. Significance levels: *< .1, **< .05, ***< .01. 
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